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What have we learned from the outpouring of literature as a result of the Stern Review of the Economics
of Climate Change? A lot. We have explored the model space and the parameter space much more
thoroughly, though there are still unexplored regions. While there are aspects of the Stern Review's
analysis with which we can disagree, it seems fair to say that it has catalyzed a fundamental rethinking
of the economic case for action on climate change. We are now in a position to give some conditions
that are sufficient to provide a case for strong action on climate change, but need more work before
we have a fully satisfactory account of the relevant economics. In particular we need to understand
better how climate change affects natural capital - the natural environment and the ecosystems comprising
it - and how these affect human welfare.
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About a year ago, the U.K. government published the Stern Review of the Economics
of Climate Change, written by a team led by Nicholas Stern [35]. The publication
of the Stern Review provoked an unprecedented outpouring of papers on the same
topic: we have probably seen more economics papers on climate change in the last year
than in all preceding history, including an entire issue of The Economists￿Voice and a
large collection in World Economics.1 And many of them were by very distinguished
colleagues, so the Stern Review provoked not only quantity but quality too. What
have we learned from all of this? Are there any emerging conclusions? In particular,
what do we have to assume to make an economic case for prompt and signi￿cant action
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions? This, it seems to me, is the really controversial
issue, and the one that matters from a policy perspective. There is a real disjunction
between economists and natural scientists on this issue: most natural scientists take
it as obvious that the consequences of climate change justify signi￿cant actions to
mitigate the buildup of greenhouse gases, whereas there is a range of opinions on
this matter among economists. What we have learned from the recent debate, and
what it takes to make a case for action on climate change, are the issues on which I
focus in this article. I suggest that the recent debate has clari￿ed many important
issues, and that we are in a position to give some conditions that are su¢ cient to
provide a case for strong action on climate change, but that we need more work
before we have a fully satisfactory account of the relevant economics. In particular,
we need to understand better how climate change a⁄ects natural capital - the natural
environment and the ecosystems comprising it - and how this in turn a⁄ects human
welfare. I take some ￿rst steps in this direction.
2 Welfare Economics and Climate Change
Let me begin with the basic economic theory of climate change. The ￿rst topic
I want to spend time on is the discount rate, but before that there is a simple,
important and interesting point that Duncan Foley has recently emphasized [11].
The emission of greenhouse gases is a massive negative external e⁄ect - the Stern
Review refers to it as possibly the greatest market failure in history. Foley￿ s point is
that with such a large uninternalized externality, the business as usual scenario with
no action on climate change cannot possibly be Pareto e¢ cient. Hence if we move to
correct the externality it must in principle be possible to make a Pareto improving
change to the world economy. If this is true then there is in aggregate no net cost
1See the references at the end of this paper. Amongst the responses to the Stern Review are
papers by Kenneth Arrow, Scott Barrett, Joshua Gans, Lawrence Goulder, Claude Henry, William
Nordhaus, Thomas Schelling, Robert Stavins and Sheila Olmsted, Thomas Sterner and Martin
Persson, Joseph Stiglitz, Richard Tol, Martin Weitzman, and many others. Most of World Economics
Vol 8 No 2 2007 is devoted to the Review.
1to correcting climate change: the gains must outweigh the costs so that the gainers
could compensate the losers and still gain. We can all come out ahead - whether we
do in fact manage this is a matter of institutional design, on which many people are
now working. The numbers in the Stern Review support this point, indicating that
the gains from action on climate change greatly outweigh the costs.
3 Discount Rates and the Environment
Now to discount rates. As anyone who has spent even a short time on this issue
must be aware, one of the controversial issues is the choice of a discount rate. By
this we mean the pure rate of time preference, to be distinguished clearly from the
consumption discount rate. The pure rate of time preference is the ￿ in the expression R 1
0 u(ct)e￿￿tdt where ct is aggregate consumption at time t; u is a utility function
showing diminishing returns to consumption and we are summing discounted utility
over all of remaining time. The other discount rate concept, the consumption discount
rate, is the rate of change of the present value of the marginal utility of consumption,
that is, the rate of change of
e￿￿tdu(ct)
dct : For the case of a single consumption good
- and we will turn to the case of multiple goods later - it follows from well-known
arguments going back to Ramsey [30] (see Heal [21] for a review) that this is
￿t = ￿ + ￿ (ct)R(ct) (1)
where ￿t is the consumption discount rate applied to consumption at time t; ￿ (ct) =
￿cu00
u0 > 0 is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption and R(ct) is the rate
of change of consumption at time t: (Here u0 =
du(c)
dc and u00 = d
dcu0:)
What do these two discount rates mean? The pure rate of time preference ￿ is
the rate at which we discount the welfare of future people just because they are in
the future: it is, if you like, the rate of intergenerational discrimination. Note that
in general there are at least two reasons why we may wish to value increments of
consumption going to di⁄erent people di⁄erently: one is that they live at di⁄erent
times, which is captured by ￿; and the other is that they have di⁄erent income levels,
which we discuss shortly.2 A pure rate of time preference greater than zero lets us
value the utility of future people less than that of present people, just because they
live in the future rather than the present. They are valued di⁄erently even if they
have the same incomes. Doing this is making the same kind of judgment as one would
make if one valued the utility of say people in Asia di⁄erently from that of people in
Africa, except that we are using di⁄erences in date rather than place as the basis for
di⁄erentiation.
2We could also value them di⁄erently for all manner of other reasons - di⁄erences in nationality,
ethnicity, and proximity either physically or genetically. In general we don￿ t do these things, at least
explicitly, which to me makes it strange that we do explicitly discriminate by proximity in time.
2There may be an argument for discounting future bene￿ts if we are uncertain that
the future will exist, if we are worried about an Armageddon at some point within our
timescale. Stern uses this argument to justify a very low pure rate of time preference.
Civilization might, for example, be destroyed by a meteor hitting the earth. My own
judgment is that over the period we are considering - say the next two centuries - the
chance of this is small enough to be neglected. However the point seems to be valid
conceptually.
That an increment of consumption is less important to a rich person than to a
poor person has long been a staple of utilitarian arguments for income redistribution
and progressive taxation (see Sen [33]), and is very widely accepted. This is re￿ ected
in the diminishing marginal utility of consumption, and the rate at which marginal
utility falls as consumption rises is captured by ￿ (ct): Equation 1 pulls together time
preference and distributional judgments: the rate at which the value of an increment
of consumption changes over time, ￿t; equals the pure rate of time preference ￿ plus
the rate at which the marginal utility of consumption is falling. This latter is the
rate at which consumption is increasing over time R(ct) times the elasticity of the
marginal utility of consumption ￿ (ct):
Note that if consumption were falling rather than rising over time, then the second
term in the expression for ￿t would be negative and the consumption discount rate
could in principle be negative, that is the value of an increment of consumption could
be rising over time rather than falling. We would not be discounting but doing the
opposite, whatever that is. It is not impossible that in a world of dramatic climate
change and environmental degradation consumption might fall at some point. It is
even more likely that some aspects of consumption would fall while other continue
to rise - recognizing this requires that we treat consumption as a vector of di⁄erent
goods that can be a⁄ected di⁄erently by climate change.3
Let￿ s follow this line of thought and disaggregate consumption at date t into a
vector ct = (c1;t;c2;t;:::cn;t) of n di⁄erent goods. Utility is increasing at a diminishing
rate in all of these and is a concave function overall. In this case we have to change
equation 1 for the consumption discount rate. Now there is a consumption discount
rate for each type of consumption and we have n equations of the form




where ￿i;t is the consumption discount rate on good i at date t; R(ci;t) is the rate of
change of consumption of good i at date t; and ￿ij (ct) is the elasticity of the marginal
utility of good i with respect to the consumption of good j (see Heal [21] for details:
the most general framework of this type can be found in Malinvaud￿ s classic 1953
paper [17]). The own elasticities such as ￿ii (ct) are positive numbers, but the cross
3For an early recognition of this point see Fisher and Krutilla [10], who comment that increasing
scarcity of wilderness areas may drive up our valuation of them.
3elasticities ￿ij (ct), j 6= i; are zero if the utility function is additively separable and
can otherwise have either sign.
As an illustration consider the constant elasticity of substitution utility function
[￿c




Here we can think of c as produced consumption and s as an environmental stock
that produces a ￿ ow of services - more on this later. In this case the cross elasticity
of the marginal utility of consumption depends on whether c and s are substitutes or
complements. For ￿ > 1 they are substitutes and the cross elasticity is positive, and
vice versa.
Let￿ s test our intuitions on this. Take the case where the environmental good
and produced consumption are highly complementary, so that indi⁄erence curves are
near to right angled and the elasticity ￿ is close to zero. Then the cross elasticity
is negative. This means that if the consumption of the environmental good is rising
then this reduces the consumption discount rate on the regular good. Conversely if
the availability of the environmental good is falling then this raises the consumption
discount rate on the consumption good. These results make sense: because of the
assumed complementarity, an increase in the amount of the environmental good will
raise the marginal utility of the consumption good and so tend to lower the consump-
tion discount rate, and vice versa. Of course, the own elasticity on the environmental
good is positive so that if the availability of this good is falling then this will tend to
make its own consumption discount rate negative.
Whether produced goods and environmental services are substitutes or comple-
ments in consumption is not an issue that has been discussed in the literature, as
we almost always work with one-good models. There do however seem to be reasons
to suppose that complementarity is the better assumption, with ￿ < 1: Dasgupta
and Heal [8], following Berry Heal and Salamon [5], suggest that in production there
are technological limits to the possibility of substituting produced goods for natural
resources. In particular we invoke the second law of thermodynamics (Berry and
Salamon are thermodynamicists) to suggest that if energy is one of the inputs to a
production process, then there is a lower bound to the isoquants on the energy axis.
Similarly one can argue that certain ecosystem services or products, such as water
and food, are essential to survival and cannot be replaced by produced goods. There
are therefore lower bounds to indi⁄erence curves along these axes, implying if the
utility function is CES that ￿ < 1:
The ￿gure illustrates this idea: it shows indi⁄erence curves for a two-argument
utility function, consumption of produced goods and of ecosystem services, as in 3
above. There is a minimum level of ecosystem services needed for survival - think
of this as water, air, and basic foodstu⁄s, all of which are ultimately produced from
natural capital. For low welfare levels there is no substitutability between these
and produced goods, so that indi⁄erence curves are close to right angled. At higher
welfare levels where there are abundant amounts of both goods there is more scope
4for substitution. Taken literally, this implies that the elasticity of substitution is
not constant but depends on and increases with welfare levels. This of course is not
re￿ ected in the CES function such as 3.
One more theoretical point is worth making in this discussion of discount rates,
and it relates to the connection if any between the discount rate and the rate of
return on capital or the rate of interest ruling in capital markets. Going back for
a moment to the case of a one-good model with just aggregate consumption in the
utility function, as in equation 1, we can easily show that under certain assumption
￿t = ￿ + ￿ (ct)R(ct) = f
0 (k) (4)
where k is an aggregate capital stock, f (k) the aggregate production function and
f0 its ￿rst derivative or the marginal product of capital (see Heal [21]). So the
consumption discount rate equals the return on capital. What are the assumptions
we need to make to get to this conclusion? We need the full panoply of perfect
market assumptions - no market failures such as external e⁄ects or public goods, and
an economy where agents have perfect foresight for the whole of future time and all
markets clear at all dates, so that the economy follows an optimal path in the Ramsey
sense over time. Taxes are also a drawback, as they drive a wedge between rates of
return.
This relationship between the consumption discount rate and the return on capital
becomes more complex if there are several goods in the utility function, as in equation
2. In the case of just two goods as in the CES function in equation 3, we have that
￿c;t = f
0 + ￿csR(s) (5)
5In this case the consumption discount rate on the consumption good depends whether
the environmental good and the consumption good are complements or substitutes
(￿cs < 0 or > 0) and on whether the availability of the environmental good is growing
or falling.
Karl-Goran M￿ler has made an interesting point about consumption discount
rates and natural capital: Stern and many others working in this area take the rate
of growth of consumption as exogenous and match it to historical records. But there is
evidence that many estimates of the rate of productivity growth are biased upwards,
because the growth accounts on which they are based omit the depletion of natural
capital. Hence growth forecasts based on these will be overly optimistic, biasing
the consumption discount rate upwards.4 In particular, Nordhaus￿ s estimates of the
exogenous rate of growth of total factor productivity in DICE will be too high.
3.1 Uncertain Discount Rates
Weitzman has argued [38] that because there is so much argument about the right
discount rate, we should think of the discount rate as being uncertain. He investigates
what this implies, and makes an interesting observation, which is that when there
are several possible discount rates and we don￿ t know which is the ￿right￿one, then
in the long run we should work with the lowest of all the possible rates. Here is a
simple example to illustrate this point. Suppose there are two possible discount rates
￿1 and ￿2 with ￿2 > ￿1: Suppose also that the chance that ￿1 is the correct rate is p:
Then the discount factor to apply to a future date t is
pe
￿￿1t + (1 ￿ p)e
￿￿2t
and its rate of change, the instantaneous discount rate, can be written
￿w1￿1 ￿ w2￿2
where w1 = pe￿￿1t=
￿
pe￿￿1t + (1 ￿ p)e￿￿2t￿
and w2 = pe￿￿2t=
￿
pe￿￿1t + (1 ￿ p)e￿￿2t￿
so w1 + w2 = 1 and limt!1 w2=w1 = 0 implying that limt!1 w1 = 1: Hence the
long-run discount rate is ￿1; the lowest possible discount rate. If that is zero, then
according to this argument we should use a zero discount rate to apply to the far
distant future.
My own judgment is that the right rate of pure time preference is zero, and I could
use Weitzman￿ s argument to justify the use of a zero pure rate of time preference in
the long term - it is certainly one of the possible rates and clearly the lowest - but
have never actually been tempted to do so. I think that this is because, although
Weitzmans￿ s result is undoubtedly technically correct, I am not totally certain of its
philosophical foundations and implications. If we disagree over the discount rate,
does it make sense to randomize across all the rates that are suggested? There may
4Personal communication, Karl-Goran M￿ler, 2008.
6be assumptions under which this is the correct thing to do, but they are not part
of Weitzman￿ s paper and they are not obvious to me. Another issue that concerns
me and makes me reluctant to put this idea into practice is that it gives you a non-
constant discount rate, one that changes over time and converges asymptotically on
the lowest rate suggested. Any intertemporal plan constructed using such a discount
rate will be dynamically inconsistent, in the sense that if we follow it for a period
of time and then stop and ask what is the best continuation from where we are, it
will not be the plan that we originally adopted. I am not sure if this matters, but it
certainly makes me pause and think.
3.2 Choosing a Discount Rate
Having set out some of the relevant theory, let￿ s return to the issue of the choice
of a discount rate, and see whether there are any non-controversial points everyone
can agree on. The ￿rst point to note is that there is a big di⁄erence between the
two discount rates we have spoken of - the pure rate of time preference and the
consumption discount rate. The pure rate of time preference is exogenous to the
economic problem, and its choice is an ethical act, a decision on the relative weights
of di⁄erent generations of human beings. The consumption discount rate, in contrast,
is in part endogenous: it depends on ￿ certainly which is exogenous but also on R(c);
the consumption growth rate, which is clearly endogenous and the outcome of the
operation of the economic system, and also on ￿ (c) which is again endogenous and
depends on the level of consumption. (These statements are obviously true whether
c is a scalar or a vector.) Of course the choice of a form for the utility function, and
therefore of the value of ￿ (c); is also an ethical choice. How much less valuable is
$100 to a rich person rather than to a poor person? ￿ answers this question, which is
clearly normative.
The bottom line, then, is that we can￿ t select either discount rate without making
ethical judgments. My own personal ethical judgment on the pure rate of time pref-
erence is that it should be zero, and in this I am in the same camp as many British
economists - Frank Ramsey [30] famously commented that ￿discounting future util-
ities is ethically indefensible and arises purely from a weakness of the imagination,￿
Roy Harrod spoke in similar terms [19], and the philosopher Henry Sidgwick com-
mented ([34], page 412) that ￿It seems ... clear that the time at which a man exists
cannot a⁄ect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view; and that the
interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as those of his contempo-
raries, except in so far as the e⁄ect of his actions on posterity - and even on the
existence of human beings to be a⁄ected - must necessarily be more uncertain.￿This
is an ethical judgment not a theorem so you don￿ t have to agree, but I personally ￿nd
it di¢ cult to see any reason for valuing future people di⁄erently from present people
just because of their futurity. Note that in choosing a pure rate of time preference we
do not take into account the fact that future people may be richer or poorer than us
7- the consumption discount rate deals with that via the terms such as ￿ (ct)R(ct): In
choosing ￿ the issue is quite simply whether we want to discriminate against future
people. I have never seen a convincing explanation of why this is the right thing to do.
I think there is often a lot of confusion between ￿ and ￿ : as we can see from equation
1 setting ￿ = 0 does not imply that the consumption discount rate is also zero. In
the one-good world, provided consumption is rising the consumption discount rate
will be positive even if the pure rate of time preference is zero.
Operationally what is the di⁄erence between these two discount rates? When do
we use ￿ and when ￿? To pick a consumption discount rate you need a consumption
growth rate. So you can￿ t use this rate when the consumption path is endogenous:
you need a growth pro￿le for the economy before you can pick the CDR. If you
are working with a model where the consumption growth rate is endogenous, you
should be using ￿ the pure rate of time preference: together with the details of
your model this will determine the CDR. More generally, if you are working with
a general equilibrium model of the entire economy such as a Ramsey model or a
dynamic multisector general equilibrium model, in which case consumption is clearly
endogenous, you have to pick a pure rate of time preference. On the other hand, if
you are doing a partial equilibrium analysis where the time path of consumption is
exogenous and not a⁄ected by the choices you are studying, then you should use the
CDR to evaluate future costs and bene￿ts relative to the present. This rate tells you
precisely what you need to know in this case - the rate at which the value of a marginal
increment of consumption is changing over time. Because it is partial equilibrium
your project will make only marginal changes about the pre-existing path. Most of
the models that have been widely used to analyze the economics of climate change,
integrated assessment models or IAMs, are dynamic general equilibrium models and
so need to be supplied with a pure rate of time preference. They will then determine
a consumption discount rate as part of the solution. So the DICE model developed
by Bill Nordhaus [27], probably the most widely-used IAM, needs to be given a pure
rate of time preference to complete its speci￿cation. This means that numbers such
as the return on capital are irrelevant when choosing the discount rate for DICE: this
is a purely ethical choice. The model will solve for a consumption discount rate which
will re￿ ect the rate of growth of consumption, the elasticity of marginal utility, and
the productivity of capital.
Let￿ s return to the relationship between the CDR and the return on capital. As
we saw in equation 4, for the aggregate one-good model this is equal to the return on
capital under certain assumptions. These are very strong indeed, and it is not clear
to me that they are relevant in the context of climate change. One assumption that
we need to get this equality is that there is no market failure, yet as the Stern Review
observed, climate change is probably the largest external e⁄ect and market failure in
history. So is it appropriate to assume no market failure in evaluating a consumption
discount rate for a model of climate change? Also required to get equation 4 is an
assumption of perfect foresight in all capital markets inde￿nitely far into the future.
8Again this is not an assumption that I personally ￿nd persuasive, particularly at
a time of crisis in capital markets. These issues are important because both Bill
Nordhaus [28] and Marty Weitzman [39] have tried to argue for or against choices of
the pure rate of time preference from observed values of the long-run return to capital.
They take equation 4, put in what they think of as reasonable numbers for ￿ and R(c);
and then judge the correctness of a value for ￿ by whether ￿ + ￿ (ct)R(ct) = f0 (k):
There are lots of things questionable here. One is that as noted we need very strong
assumptions for this equation to hold, assumptions that seem to be particularly out
of place in a discussion of climate change. There is also the issue of deducing an
￿ought￿from an ￿is,￿recognized as a philosophically dubious step since the time
of Hume. But leaving these aside, you can argue that it is using equation 4 in the
wrong way. Instead of going from f0; ￿ and R to ￿; we should go the other way. The
meaning of ￿ is clear and I think it is obvious what its value should be - zero. I think
we know this with some con￿dence. But we don￿ t know ￿ and we probably have at
best rough estimates of R and f0: If this equation were convincing and relevant there
is a case for using it to go from ￿ to ￿, R and f0 rather than the other way round.
There is of course another shortcoming in using equation 4 to make statements
about this pure rate of time preference, and another reason why its relevance is
limited, which you can see immediately from equation 5. This is that it does not
apply if there is more than one argument to the utility function, which is the case if it
is important to distinguish between several di⁄erent elements of consumption, because
for example they will behave di⁄erently in response to climate change. To develop this
point we need to talk about natural capital and ecosystem services. As the World
Bank recently emphasized, natural capital is an important part of the wealth of
nations [41]. Ecosystem services are some of the returns that come from that capital,
and are of great importance to human societies (Barbier and Heal [2]). Climate
change will deplete natural capital and reduce the ￿ ow of ecosystem services. Both
the Stern Review and the IPCC Fourth Assessment Reports [25] are in agreement
that this may in the long run be the most important and most costly aspect of climate
change. That is why in equation 3 I have distinguished two types of consumption,
one conventional consumption c and the other a stock of environmental or natural
capital s that generates a ￿ ow of services, many of which may be essential for human
survival. This is not a new distinction: it started with Je⁄rey Krautkramer [26], was
developed by Heal [20], and has been emphasized recently by Roger Guesnerie [14]
and by Thomas Sterner and Martin Persson [36]. On the assumption that s is falling
over time because of climate change, we see from 5 that
￿c;t = f
0 + ￿csR(s)
Here R(s) < 0 but we don￿ t know the sign of ￿cs; which as noted above is positive
if consumption and the environment are substitutes and negative if they are comple-
ments. By arguments given earlier, it seems likely to be negative. This means that
even in a fully ￿rst best world with perfect foresight and all interactions captured
9by the market, we cannot be sure whether the discount rate on consumption goods
should exceed or be less than the return on capital.
3.3 A Sterner Perspective
It￿ s worth looking in more detail at the Sterner and Persson development of this point.
They talk about the e⁄ect of changes in relative prices rather than consumption of
produced and environmental goods, but the point is the same. If we consume both
produced goods and the services of the environment, as in the utility function 3,
then we can expect that with climate change environmental services will become
scarce relative to produced goods and therefore their price will rise relative to that
of produced goods. Consequently the present value of an increment of environmental
services may be rising over time, and the consumption discount rate on environmental
services may thus be negative, precisely the point that we were making in equation 2
above. This could be the case even with a positive pure rate of time preference, which
is the main point of the Sterner and Persson paper. They also present an interesting
modi￿cation of Nordhaus￿ s DICE model to incorporate this point. They replace the
standard utility function, which is an isoelastic function of aggregate consumption, by






They assume that the supply of environmental services s is negatively a⁄ected by
temperature according to the square of temperature, and that the share of environ-
mental goods in consumption is about 20%, use these assumptions to calibrate the
modi￿ed DICE model and and then run the model with the discount rate used by
Nordhaus. Their runs show that even with such a high discount rate the presence of
an environmental stock that is damaged by higher temperatures radically transforms
the optimal emissions path of CO2 and leads to a vastly more conservative policy
towards climate change, with emissions both staying lower and falling faster. In fact
it leads to a more aggressive reduction in greenhouse gases than recommended by the
Stern Review.
4 Uncertainty
Uncertainty is one of the dominant facts in any analysis of climate change. It￿ s
not that the underlying science is uncertain: the mechanisms through which the
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere warm the earth are simple and
well-understood. The point is that there is some debate about whether they will lead
to a temperature rise of 2 degrees Celsius or 6 degrees, or possibly even more. There
is also some uncertainty about the implications of any given temperature change for
climate in the more general sense of patterns of precipitation, winds, humidity, etc.
10Furthermore, even if we were to know accurately and in detail how the climate is going
to change, we would still not understand fully the implications for social and economic
activity. An additional problem is that the type of uncertainty we face here does
not ￿t the economists￿traditional model of decision-making under uncertainty. The
traditional model presumes that we have a known state space, a known (objective or
subjective) probability distribution, and an expected utility function. In the context
of climate change, we certainly don￿ t have a known probability distribution: we have
some information about the relative likelihood of di⁄erent outcomes but usually not
enough to form a full-￿ edged probability distribution. In the terminology of Frank
Knight, we are dealing with uncertainty rather than risk. In more contemporary
terminology, we are in the world of ambiguity, where probabilities are not known.
This raises some complex issues, but to start with we look at some of the more
straightforward aspects of risk, where probabilities are assumed to be known.
There is an analog of equation 1, ￿t = ￿+￿ (ct)R(ct); which addresses uncertainty
in the growth rate R(ct): Assume the growth rate at time t is a random variable
drawn from a distribution that is identically and independently distributed at each
time, drawn from a normal distribution N (￿;￿2): The the equivalent to 1 is just






so that the consumption discount rate is reduced as both the mean and the variance
of the growth rate increase.
Another point about uncertainty that has been made by a number of authors
is that climate change and many of its consequences are irreversible.5 Melting of
ice sheets and glaciers, extinction of species, and destruction of corral reefs, are all
irreversible, at least on a timescale relevant to human societies. Furthermore, as there
are many things we do not know about climate change and its social and economic
consequences, there is a real chance that we shall learn over time about the costs and
bene￿ts of climate change. In such a situation, there is a real option value associated
with preserving the current climate. This is an argument for conservation, but not
one that we can easily evaluate in quantitative terms.
4.1 Risk Aversion
There is of course a more conventional risk-aversion argument for mitigating climate
change. Uncertainty about the consequences of climate change means that we bear a
risk, and risk-bearing is an activity to which most of us are averse. We pay insurers
to bear our risks for us. I present next some simple yet suggestive calculations due to
Heal and Kristrom [22] indicating the importance of risk aversion. These calculations
were addressed to the question: what cost is it worth incurring to avoid the risk
of climate change? Within a simple framework we can carry out calculations that
5See Fisher and Narain [9], and for a survey see Heal and Kristrom [22].
11illustrate the issues involved, and how discount rates, risk aversion and probabilities
interact.6
Denote society￿ s income in the absence of climate change by I and the bene￿ts
derived from this income by utility u(I). The expected utility after climate change
is
P
j pju(Ij):7 Climate change occurs, if it occurs at all, in year C: Denote by ￿ ￿ 1
the weight given to costs or bene￿ts at date t+1 relative to those at t; so that ￿
t￿1 is
the weight given to those at t relative to those at 1: Then (1￿￿)￿100 is the discount
rate as a percent.
Suppose that it possible by incurring a cost from now to the date C at which
climate change might occur, to rule out this occurrence. What cost x is it worth our
while incurring, from now to C; in order to ensure that the climate does not change
















The left hand side is the loss of utility in incurring the cost x from now to the time
C of climate change, with future losses discounted back to the present: the loss each
year is [u(I) ￿ u(I ￿ x)]; and we sum this, discounted, over all years up to C. The
right hand side is what we would lose each year, in expected value terms, if climate
change were to occur, summed from its occurrence at C to a distant date T, and







This sum on the right is therefore also the bene￿t of avoiding climate change. The
maximum we should be willing to pay is the value of x at which these two are equal:
hence the equation. The date T is the maximum time horizon that we consider
relevant to these calculations.
As a concrete illustration, we can think of x as the extra cost of moving as fast as
possible to energy based on non-fossil sources, such as solar, geothermal or biomass.
As these technologies develop, this cost will decline: we assume that it is zero by
the time at which climate change would occur, which in the illustrative calculations
is taken to be ￿fty years hence. Obviously there are some heroic assumptions here.
Climate change is taken to be a discrete event. Preventive expenditures are assumed
to be constant. But nevertheless the numbers may be indicative.
Below we present values of x for some illustrative parameter values and indicate
their sensitivity to the assumptions. What we should be willing to pay, x, is expressed
6The calculations that follow are taken from work in progress by Geo⁄rey Heal and Yun Lin,
Columbia University.
7If there is climate change, then income drops from I to Ij with probability pj; where clearly
Ij ￿ I and
P
j pj ￿ 1. This can be weakened to allow an income drop on the average, in order to
include a possibility for income increases. With risk aversion, people would still be willing to pay to
avoid the change. Thanks to Mark Machina for pointing this out.
12as a percent of the income level8 I, which is taken to be 10. The calculations are
only illustrative: we do not know enough about the costs or probabilities of climate
change to make presenting a best estimate of x a useful exercise. The key conclusion
is that for some parameter values that must be within the set considered possible, one
might wish to spend up to 8.13% of national income on avoiding climate change. For
other parameter values that are also possible, the number may be 0.1%. Even this
is a big number in absolute terms. The most critical parameter in these calculations
is an economic parameter, the discount rate. The index of risk aversion is also very
in￿ uential.
A reasonable functional form for the utility functions u(I); widely used in em-
pirical studies of behavior under uncertainty, is the family of functions displaying
constant relative risk aversion: the index of relative risk aversion (IRRA) for u(I) at
income I is ￿Iu00=u0. A reasonable range of empirical values for the index of relative
risk aversion is from 2 to 6:
Table 2 reports the values of x in the equation above for alternative combinations
of the discount rate in percent, denoted ￿; and the index of relative risks aversion.
We work with three possible distributions of losses from climate change, called A,
B and C and summarized in table 1. In the ￿rst there is a 20% chance of a loss of
income of ￿ve percent, a 10% chance of an income loss of 15% and a 5% chance of
a loss of 25% as a result of global warming. By implication, there is a 65% chance
of no loss at all, and the expected loss is 3.75% of current income. This ￿gure for
the expected loss is generally consistent with the IPCC￿ s estimate of the loss from
climate change from its third assessment report, and rather more conservative than
the estimates from its most recent report or from the Stern Review. The other two
cases are even more conservative: the possible losses are lower and the probabilities
are concentrated more at the low end of the distribution. In the most conservative
case, the expected loss is fractionally under 1% of income, with a probability of 0.24
of an income loss of 2%, a probability of 0.10 of a loss of 5% and a probability of 0.01
of a loss of 10%.9
8Because of the choice of functions for which the IRRA is constant, the ratio x=I is independent
of the value of I; so that we do not need to think hard in choosing a value for I.
9For an interesting review of the available evidence on the probabilities of loss from climate change
see Roughgarden and Schneider [32], who take a range of expert opinions and ￿t a systematic
probability density function to these. Heal is in the process of recomputing this model with the
probability-of-loss function given in Roughgarden and Schneider.
13Probability
Loss A B C
2% 0.24





0 0.65 0.65 0.65
E. Loss 3.75% 2.99% 0.99%
Table 1: alternative probability distributions.
As mentioned, the date for climate change C is assumed to be ￿fty years, and we
take the upper limit of the sum of bene￿ts T to be 1000.
Table 2 reports the results of solving the equation for x for probability distribution
A and a range values for the discount rate (from 1% to 5%) and for the IRRA (from
0 to 6). (For results for the other distributions see Heal and Kristrom.)
IRRA 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
￿
1 5.74 6.07 6.42 6.81 7.22 7.66 8.13
2 2.15 2.32 2.50 2.72 2.96 3.23 3.54
3 1.05 1.13 1.23 1.35 1.48 1.64 1.82
4 0.56 0.61 0.66 0.73 0.81 0.89 1.00
5 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.41 0.45 0.50 0.56
Table 2: willingness-to-pay for distribution A.
4.2 Unknown Probabilities
Some interesting papers have recently tried to tackle directly the point that we
don￿ t know the probability distribution governing the consequences of climate change.
Claude and Marc Henry have looked at this issue from the perspective of ambiguity
theory [24], the theory of choice in the face of incomplete probability distributions
(see also Claude Henry [23]), and Martin Weitzman has looked at it from the per-
spective of learning about unknown parameters, including those of the probability
distribution [40]. In each case the assumption is that we don￿ t know the distribution
of damages from climate change: in the case of the Henry paper, the lack of knowl-
edge is of a very general kind, with some information about the relative likelihoods of
di⁄erent regions of the state space but not enough to form a probability distribution.
Decision problems in this framework have been analyzed in an axiomatic framework
14similar to that introduced by von Neuman and Morgenstern for expected utility the-
ory by Ghirardato and Marinacci [13]. The central result of the Henry paper is that
it in such a context it would be wrong to use standard expected utility theory and
neglect the ambiguity. They see this a providing a limited degree of support for the
much-debated ￿precautionary principle.￿
Weitzman assumes that we know the type of distribution that governs the damages
from climate change but not its parameters, and also that we are uncertain about one
of the key parameters driving climate change, the climate sensitivity parameter, and
models the process of learning about these parameters. I will attempt to summarize
his analysis in the context of a simple example that he uses in his paper. This focuses
on the ￿climate sensitivity￿parameter relating the change in atmospheric greenhouse
gas concentrations to the change in global mean temperature. Climate scientists





where T is global mean temperature and S the climate sensitivity parameter. Weitz-





where ￿ > 1: He uses a two-period model where consumption in the ￿rst period is
normalized to unity and the growth rate of consumption from present to future is
Y : = lnc where c is second period consumption. This growth rate depends on the
climate sensitivity and for very large values of this parameter could be negative - if
the increase in climate is so large as to lower consumption (a possibility discussed
in the context of discount rates above). In general the distribution of Y depends on
that of S; with the left tail of Y corresponding to the right tail of S : large values of
the climate sensitivity parameter lead to low or negative growth rates. The expected
present value of an increment of consumption in the second period is given by
E (M) = ￿e
￿￿Y
where ￿ 2 (0;1] is the one-period discount factor and M is the amount of consumption
we would give up today to get one unit next period with certainty. Weitzman assumes
that the growth rate Y is normally distributed as N (￿;￿2) and that we know ￿ but
not ￿; which we have to estimate from data on the history of the climate system. In
this case
E (M) = exp
￿








by the same arguments as gave 6 above. So far this is all straightforward. Next
we look at the consequences of not knowing ￿ : to develop these Weitzman adopts
a Bayesian approach, and assumes a prior distribution of ￿: This he takes to be a
15uniform distribution of ln￿ on (0;1): With these assumptions he shows that E(M) =
+1; so that we are willing to give up an unlimited amount of consumption today
to assure one unit in the future. We are, in other words, extraordinarily risk-averse
about the future under these assumptions.
This is a somewhat surprising result. Technically it comes from the fact that
a range of well-behaved distributions such as power law distributions have in￿nite
means. Weitzman assumes that Y is distributed normally, but when he adds in that
the variance of the normal is unknown with a noninformative prior then the result
is a distribution of Y that has some of the properties of power law distributions,
namely it has a ￿fat tail,￿meaning that there is much more weight in the tails of
the distribution than there is in the normal and in most of the distributions we
usually work with. This in turn means that the risks of extreme outcomes - very
large temperature changes and consequent large economic losses - are signi￿cantly
greater than one would expect from working with a normal distribution of risks.
This result raises a number of questions - about its robustness and its economic
implications. Let￿ s look at the robustness issue ￿rst. Several assumptions are made in
deriving this outcome. One is a noninformative prior distribution over the variance of
the growth rate. Another is that we know the mean of the distribution of growth rates
but not the variance. It is not clear how well the result would survive changes in these
assumptions. However these are technical points, and it the result would probably
survive in some form for other reasonable assumptions. A more fundamental issue is
a more abstract one. Weitzman considers a decision problem where the probabilities
over outcomes are unknown, and rather than adopting an axiomatic framework simi-
lar to but more general than that underlying the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern
framework - as used by the Henrys and those on whose work they draw - he assumes
we can work within the standard expected utility framework which assumes known
probabilities, even though the essence of his problem is that the probabilities are un-
known. There is a di¢ cult problem here: what is the right way of analyzing decision
problems where probabilities are not known? Should we work within the expected
utility framework, even though this has known probabilities built in as fundamen-
tal assumptions, take a Bayesian approach and model learning about the unknown
parameters, or should we deal directly with the ambiguity associated with unknown
probabilities? To take the Bayesian approach appears to be in contradiction to one of
the Henry￿ s results on the suboptimality of the use of the subjective expected utility
framework in the context of ambiguity. This is a fundamental question to which we
do not know the answer.
Next let￿ s look at the implications of this result. It￿ s saying that if we think that
the risks we face from climate change are normally distributed but we don￿ t know
the variance of the distribution and have a noninformative prior, then actually we
are facing risks governed by a much more threatening distribution than the normal,
one that has far more weight out in the tails and therefore a far greater chance than
we might have thought of a really negative outcome. Overall I ￿nd this a worrying
16and thought-provoking result, though as I indicated in the previous paragraph I am
not sure what is the best approach to decision-making with unknown risks. We need
a lot more thinking about this issue.
5 Equity and Climate Change
There are two dimensions of equity that are important in the context of climate
change. One we have already discussed, equity between present and future genera-
tions. The other dimension concerns equity between rich and poor countries both now
and in the future. This second dimension is invisible in aggregative one-good models,
and indeed we have already noted that we need a many-good model to talk seriously
about discount rates and climate change. The discussions below will reinforce the
need for some measure of disaggregation in the analysis of the economics of climate
change.
We have already spent some time on equity between present and future and on
the role of the parameter ￿; the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. As
noted, this summarizes amongst others our preference for equality as it determines
how fast marginal utility falls as income rises. There are two ways in which our
preference for equality a⁄ects the case for action on climate change.
One has already been discussed: as ￿ rises, the marginal utility of consumption
falls more rapidly. If consumption is growing over time, then this means that the
marginal utility of future generations falls more rapidly with larger values of ￿ and
therefore we are less concerned about bene￿ts or costs to future generations. We are
less future-oriented - the consumption discount rate ￿ is higher - and so place less
value on stopping climate change. So via this mechanism, a stronger preference for
equality leads to a less aggressive position on the need for action on climate change.
There is another o⁄setting e⁄ect, which as noted is not visible in an aggregative
model. Climate change is an external e⁄ect imposed to a signi￿cant degree by rich
countries on poor countries. The great majority of the greenhouse gases currently
in the atmosphere were put there by the rich countries, and the biggest losers will
be the poor countries - though the rich will certainly lose as well. Because of this, a
stronger preference for equality will make us more concerned to take action to reduce
climate change.
So we have an ambiguous impact of a stronger preference for equity on our at-
titude towards climate change. Via the mechanism captured in the formula for the
consumption discount rate, it makes us less future oriented - provided consumption
is growing. (If consumption were to fall, it would make us more future oriented.)
And via our concern for the poor countries in the world today it makes us more
future-oriented.
Unfortunately, without exception analytical models capture only the ￿rst of these
e⁄ects. They are aggregative one-sector models or models with no distributive weights
and so their operation does not re￿ ect the second mechanism mentioned above. This
17explains the really puzzling and counter-intuitive result that a greater preference for
equality in Nordhaus￿ s DICE model leads to less concern about climate change.
To capture fully the contradictory impacts of preferences for equality on climate
change policy, we need a model that is disaggregated both by consumption goods
and by consumers, allowing us to study the consumption of environmental as well as
non-environmental goods and also the di⁄erential impacts of climate change on rich
and poor nations.
6 Costs of Climate Change
Having reviewed some of the theoretical issues raised by the recent literature on
climate change, it is time to look at the estimates that are available of the costs and
bene￿ts of action to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.
6.1 The Costs of Action
I look ￿rst at the costs of action to prevent climate change, as this seems to be the less
controversial of the two areas. The latest IPCC report estimates the cost of keeping
CO2 equivalent concentrations below about 450 parts per million (ppm) as less than
3% of world GDP by 2030 and less than 5.5% by 2050. The Stern review estimates
the costs of keeping these concentrations at less than 500-550 ppm as within the range
-1% to +3%, with a best estimate of 1%. This is a continuing cost. These statements
already illustrate a point that concerns me about the analysis of the costs and bene￿ts
of climate change, which is this habit of expressing things as a percentage of national
income. Clearly there are many reasons for wanting to do this, not the least of which
is the desire to give a sense of scale. But there is an implication here that as GDP
rises then the costs of stopping climate change will rise in proportion. Is this true?
If we double our income, do we double the cost of stopping climate change? This is
not obvious to me. The same issue arises with respect to the damages from climate
change: these are typically expressed by a multiplicative factor on national income,
which again implies that if income doubles then the damages will double. This is
once again not a self-evident point. If incomes double, does the value of land lost
due to sea level rise double? Does the cost of extinction of species double? We can
probably write out models in which this is true, but it is not clear that they will be
convincing.
We can get a rough sense of whether these numbers are reasonable from some back-
of-the-envelope calculations. Suppose we need to reduce CO2 emissions by about 30
gigatons annually: currently that would take emissions down close to zero, but as
they are growing quite fast it would leave them positive but small for the next few
decades. Assume that the average cost per ton of reducing emissions is $40, which
is within the range considered by the IPCC and also by several other studies. Then
reducing emissions by 30x109 tons at $40 per ton leads to a total cost of 2.6% of world
18GDP. The cost of reducing emissions could on average be less than $40 per ton, as
there are plenty of opportunities to reduce emissions at less than this cost, and this
assumes a reduction to close to zero, much more than would be required to stabi-
lize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. Futhermore, the deployment of
greenhouse gas reduction technologies on so large a scale would almost certainly lead
to large reductions in costs. So the numbers that Stern and the IPCC quote seem
reasonable.
6.2 The Costs of Inaction
Here there is a lot of disagreement. Most of the integrated assessment models suggest
that the costs of climate change would be of the order of 1 or 2 percent of national
income. Stern suggests a much larger number, at least 5% and possibly as much as
20%. These numbers are the annuitized costs of climate change - the annuities with
the same present value as the damages from climate change. I am inclined to think
that Stern is much nearer the mark: it is impossible to read the IPCC reports and
believe that the consequences of climate change along the business as usual (BAU)
path are only 1 or 2 percent of national income. 1% is almost within the margin of
accounting error, and the IPCC certainly gives the impression that climate change will
have a far-reaching impact on many human activities, which is not consistent with so
small a value. Recent work by Hanemann, Fisher and Schlenker [18] suggests climate
change on the BAU scenario will have a dire impact on U.S. agriculture, reducing the
value of output by as much as 70% by the end of the century. William Cline￿ s recent
book [6] also suggests that climate change on the BAU scenario will have a severe
harmful impact on agricultural output in many countries, including many developing
countries where agriculture is a large fraction of total output.10 And of course while
agricultural output accounts for only a small fraction of GDP in the U.S., if food were
to become scarce it is clear that prices would rise to the point where this could change
drastically. Our current spending on food greatly understates our willingness-to-pay
for food.
The Stern estimate of 5% of GDP is presented as the lower bound for the cost of
climate change on the BAU scenario. The Review comments that ￿Modeling work
undertaken by the Review suggests that the risks and costs of climate change over
the next two centuries could be equivalent to an average reduction in global per
capita consumption of at least 5%, now and for ever. The estimated damages would
be much higher if non-market impacts, the possibility of greater climate sensitivity,
and distributional issues were taken into account.￿They are leaving out any impact
not re￿ ected in market transactions, assuming a rather conservative value for the key
climate sensitivity parameter - the parameter S in equation 8, about which Weitzman
models uncertainty - and not taking in to account the fact that many of the costs of
10A recent paper by Guiteras [16] looks at the impact of climate change on Indian agriculture and
predicts signi￿cant loss of output.
19climate change will fall most heavily on the poor. By adopting a conservative value
for the sensitivity parameter they are ruling out the extreme outcomes in the tail of
the distribution of outcomes that are the focus of Weitzman￿ s study.
It is easy to see the kinds of issues omitted by not considering non-market e⁄ects of
climate change. The IPCC estimates that of the order of one third of all species could
be driven to extinction along a BAU scenario. This would be a radical transformation
and impoverishment of our biological environment, with far-reaching implications
for the ￿ ow of ecosystem services to human societies and also with major ethical
implications. Do we have the right to condemn to extinction many of the species
with which we share the planet? Opinions vary, and interestingly this is an issue on
which evangelical Christians are increasingly taking a position.
The Stern review follows the mainstream of economic analysis in mentioning and
then neglecting the distributional impacts of climate change. Yet as Sterner and
Persson point out, it is not so long since economists were attaching distributional
weights to the costs and bene￿ts in project evaluation. The Stern Review mentions
this possibility, but does not develop it at all. The report accepts the principle that
the value of an increment of consumption decreases with the recipient￿ s income level
in using an elasticity of marginal utility of consumption of unity, so it would be quite
consistent with its underlying ethical assumptions to apply the distributional weights
implied by this choice. This is a point that Dasgupta [7] emphasizes.
7 The Case for Action
Stern and his team argue that there is a strong case for immediate and e⁄ective
action. Nordhaus, on the other hand, argues for a far more circumspect approach,
with a gradual ramp up from small beginnings over several decades. Most IAMs give
similar conclusions to Nordhaus. Who is right - or rather, under what assumptions
is each side right? And which assumptions are better?
There are ￿ve key issues that between them determine whether the analysis sug-
gests a case for strong and immediate action or not. One, of course, is the value
assigned to the costs of climate change. (I am not mentioning the cost of preventing
climate change as there is general agreement on this.) The second, inevitably, is the
choice of a pure rate of time preference. The third is the choice of an elasticity of
the marginal utility of consumption. Fourthly there is the issue of whether we break
out and model explicitly the consumption of ecosystem services yielded by our stock
of natural capital and the impact that climate change will have on this. And ￿nally
there is the issue of uncertainty and the possibility of really severe impacts associated
with a climate path that the IPCC regards as possible but unlikely.
Di⁄erent selections on these ￿ve issues get di⁄erent conclusions about the need for
action. Stern, for example, chooses ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1 and estimates the damages from
climate change to be high. This combination of assumptions, together with histori-
cally normal rates of consumption growth R(c) and a single aggregate consumption
20good, justi￿es strong and immediate action. Nordhaus sets ￿ = 3; ￿ = 1 and makes
conservative assumptions about damages, concluding that there is no case for strong
immediate action. If we replace Stern￿ s ￿ = 1 by ￿ = 3; his numbers no longer justify
immediate action, even with ￿ = 0: This re￿ ects the fact that in an aggregative model,
a stronger preference for equality reduces our concern from the (richer) future and
therefore our interest in preventing climate change. It is hard to know what ￿ should
be: Weitzman argues for ￿ = 2; Heal and Kristrom cite the empirical literature on
￿nancial markets which suggests that the index of relative risk aversion (which is ￿)
is between 2 and 6. Dasgupta comments on ￿ = 1 as follows: ￿￿ = 1 is to insist that
any proportionate increase in someone￿ s consumption is of equal social worth to that
same proportional increase in the consumption of any other contemporary no matter
how rich or poor. With ￿ = 0 it implies that any proportionate increase in consump-
tion today is of the same social worth as the same proportional increase at any other
date no matter how rich or poor the people then.￿Another perspective is that ￿ = 1
implies that taking $1 from a person earning $1000 can be compensated by giving
$1,000,000 to Bill Gates.11 Dasgupta and Weitzman argue for a higher value of ￿;
which would imply an even more striking trade-o⁄: you would have to give even more
that $1,000,000 to Bill Gates to compensate for taking $1 from the person earning
$1000. Weitzman suggests that the risk of an outlying outcome is su¢ cient to justify
strong action - he thinks that Stern is right in his recommendations but for the wrong
reason. Sterner and Persson argue, as have Heal and Guesnerie, that disaggregating
consumption and modelling the ￿ ow of services from ecosystems, which are likely to
be seriously damaged by changing climates, will justify action on climate change even
with the discount rates and elasticities favored by Nordhaus.
The following table summarizes these conclusions: it shows the combinations of
assumptions used by each author and the conclusions reached with respect to the
need for strong and immediate action. ESS denote ecosystem services - whether
the author models these explicitly. Risk likewise indicates whether the author takes
the risk of extreme outcomes into account. I have inserted a question mark under
costs for the work of Sterner and Persson (S&P) because they work with Nordhaus￿ s
DICE model, which has low estimates of the costs of climate change, but by modeling
climate damage to natural capital and the ecosystem services ￿ owing from it, they
are inserting a new element into the costs of climate change, an element not present
in the original DICE model.
Author Stern Nordhaus S&P Weitzman
￿ 0 3 3 2
￿ 1 1 1 2
ESS No No Yes No
Risk No No No Yes
Costs High Low ? High
Strong action Yes No Yes Yes
11On the assumption that his income is $1 billion.
21We can see from this that there are several ways of concluding that we need to
take action. We can follow the route of the Stern review and use a low discount rate
and set ￿ = 1, or we can allow for climate impacts on ecosystem services, or we can
be explicitly concerned about the risk of an outcome in the tail of the distribution
of possible outcomes. Any of these seems su¢ cient to justify immediate action. And
several of them seem plausible. My own personal judgment would be to set ￿ = 0; to
disaggregate consumption and model the e⁄ect of climate on ecosystem services, and
to worry about the risk out extreme outcomes, a blend of Stern, Sterner and Persson
and Weitzman. That would certainly secure a case for very strong and immediate
action, more so than the Stern Review. But if you disagree with me on the choice of
a pure rate of time preference, but agree with me on the other matters, or even on
one of them, you would still have to agree that there is a case for strong action now.
The table misses out one framework that it would be interesting to explore, because
no one has looked it them till now. This is a model disaggregated by both consumers
and consumption goods with an explicit use of distributional weights not only over
time, as is customary in utilitarian models, but also across countries. My guess is
that this would increase the case for action on climate change, but in the absence of
a model incorporating this framework this remains a guess.
8 Conclusions
To return to the questions with which I opened this article: what have we learned
from the outpouring of literature as a result of the Stern Review? A lot. We have
explored the model space and the parameter space much more thoroughly, though
there are still unexplored regions. I think this should change the presumption that
economists hold about the need for strong action on climate change, which prior to
Stern was largely negative, to positive. We can see many ways in which we can make
a case for strong action now, and few in which we can deny it. While there are
aspects of the Stern Review￿ s analysis with which we can disagree, it seems fair to
say that it has catalyzed a fundamental rethinking of the economic case for action
on climate change. Recent developments both allow us to see more clearly conditions
under which there is a case for acting quickly and strongly on climate change, and the
conditions under which such action is not justi￿ed. There are several combinations
of assumptions that justify strong action, depending on choices of the pure rate of
time preference, the elasticity of marginal utility, the costs of climate change and the
nature of uncertainty and the way in which we react to this. The analysis also reveals
that in spite of the extensive literature, there are issues that remain to be explored,
many of which are related to the fact that most modeling to date has been in the
context of one-good one-country models. We have really not spent enough time on
the impact of climate change on our natural capital and the ways in which it may
compromise the ￿ ow of essential ecosystem services from this. Nor do we have much
by the way of modelling of our preferences for such services and of the degree of
22substitutability between produced goods and services and ecosystem services. These
parameters a⁄ect consumption discount rates and their relationships with market
data such as interest rates. Understanding these issues will require models that are
more disaggregated than those that have been used to date, as will representing more
satisfactorily the issues raised by a concern for equity at the international level. It
is very clear that most of the models analyzed to date are so aggregated as to miss
many important issues.
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